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  We experimentally study the effect of time on altruism. By postponing payments in a 
standard Dictator game, subjects allocate a future payment between themselves and others. 
Since both the payoffs of the Dictator and the Receiver are delayed until the same time, 
standard intertemporal utility maximization would predict that waiting time should not affect 
the Dictator’s choice. In this respect, we observe that Dictators’decisions are not affected, as 
long as the time interval between the decision and payment is not large. On the other hand, 
for large time gaps, subjects become more self-interested. 
Keywords: Altruism, Discounting, Dictator game, Intertemporal choice. 




There are two classes of models that explain altruistic behavior. Apparently,
altruistic behavior may arise as a by-product of the intertemporal structure of
the model. Individuals act as if they were not sel￿sh, with the ultimate goal of
maximizing their own well-being (Trivers, 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981,
Kreps et al.,1982). Social preferences, on the other hand, assume that people
are directly interested in both their own and others￿material gains (Camerer,
2003, Sobel, 2005).
The reasons why these two types of model may predict non-sel￿sh behavior
are fundamentally di⁄erent. In the ￿rst type of model, non-sel￿sh behavior
disappears if time horizon is short. Only the latter type of model really views
humans as non-sel￿sh. Little is known, though, about what happens if we
combine social preferences with the intertemporal structure of the ￿rst type
of model. Can the time structure a⁄ect the decisions of individuals if others￿
well-being is involved?
This study analyzes this issue in the framework of the classic experimental
protocol of the Dictator game. In this game, a player, the Dictator, is given
an initial endowment, S, which she can either keep for herself, or share with
another player, the Receiver. The Dictator can give to the Receiver any amount
c 2 [0;S]; which we call "gift". The Receiver cannot but accept the proposed
payo⁄ distribution. Positive giving in Dictator game has been found to be
an extremely robust phenomenon (Camerer, 2003, Eckel and Grossman, 1996,
Ho⁄man et al., 1994), which is interpreted as evidence of altruistic behavior.
A common feature of Dictator game experiments is to pay the experimental
subjects right after the end of the experiment. Time-proximity of payment
might enhance people￿ s feelings of guilt, the warm glow of giving, or, on the
other hand, the temptation to keep the endowment for oneself.
The ￿rst question, then, is: Does it matter if payments are executed not the
same day, but rather in few days? And does it make any di⁄erence whether
payment is after 2 or 6 days, or even later? To provide a robust answer to
this question, we experimentally test how Dictators￿decisions change as the
time interval between the moment of decision and payment widens. In this
respect, we observe that the median gift does not di⁄er, as long as the time gap
between decision and payment is small enough. For large time gaps, however,
subjects tend to behave more sel￿shly. This evidence notwithstanding, our data
also show that the average gift does not converge to zero. Rather, it stays
signi￿cantly above zero, even for the largest gap.
2 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted in May 2007 at University of Alicante, using
the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were University
students from various ￿elds. The game played was a standard Dictator game
2with an initial endowment of 1000 Spanish pesetas (worth e 6).1 The novel as-
pect of our experiment was to postpone the payment, thus creating a time gap
between the time of decision (the experiment) and the time of payment (our
treatment variable). Denote t the di⁄erence in days between the experiment
and the payment time. We performed 6 treatments, with t = 2;6;10;14;18;22.
There were 24 subjects per session - 12 Dictators and 12 Receivers. This pro-
vided us with 12 completely independent observations per session, 72 for the
whole experiment. The Dictator game lasted around 15 minutes and the ques-
tionnaire around 10 minutes. The stake chosen, 6e, corresponds to 24e per hour
what exceeds more than twice the average hourly wage a University student can
earn.
In order to pay subjects, we asked for their bank account numbers, and the
payo⁄s were paid via bank transfers to their respective accounts. We aimed to
make the postponed payment as smooth as possible for the experimental sub-
jects, so that to avoid any potential in￿ uence of issues related to the availability
of such a small quantity on their decisions.
In each session, the experimental instructions were read aloud and the ex-
perimental subjects were given time to ask questions.2 When there were no
questions left, subjects were randomly assigned to their roles, before the exper-
iment started. Afterwards, one round of the Dictator game, without any time
limit for the decision, was played. After the Dictators made their decisions and
everybody learnt their payo⁄s, we asked the subjects to ￿ll in a questionnaire,
which we used to control for individual ￿xed e⁄ects.3
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 plots the median Dictators￿gifts for the 6 treatments. The x-axis
reports the time di⁄erence between the decision and payment, t; the y axis
reports treatment medians. For t = 2 and 6, we observe medians above 150.
The means are slightly lower than 20% of the stakes, reproducing standard
experimental results.4
Put Figure 1 around here
1It is standard practice, for all experiments run in Alicante, to use Spanish ptas. as
experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer
problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On the other hand,
although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use (substituted by the Euro in the year 2001),
Spanish people still use Pesetas to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this
respect, by using a ￿real￿ (as a opposed to an arti￿cial) currency, we avoid the problem of
framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g. ￿Experimental Currency￿)
with no cognitive content.
2The translation of the experimental instructions can be found in Appendix.
3The translation of the questionnaire questions can be found on
http://merlin.fae.ua.es/iturbe/Questions.pdf.





























Figure 1. The median gifts.
9A more interesting pattern unfolds for t > 6. The median gift jumps from 150
in t = 6 to 0 in t = 10 and stays low in 3 out of the 4 cases. The only treatment
with non-zero median is t = 18 where it equals 100, which is considerably
higher than the medians of t = 10;14 and 22, but also considerably lower than
the medians corresponding to t = 2 and t = 6. We attribute this high median to
presence of few altruistic Dictators. Such individuals can easily drive descriptive
statistics up.
Interestingly, even though more sel￿shness emerges as the gap between the
decision and payment increases, there still remains some positive giving which
does not vanish as delay grows large. The average gift is 75 for t = 10, 71 for
t = 14, it jumps up for t = 18, and stays at 69 for the last treatment. Thus, it
seems that the average gift and the level of altruism, on general, do not converge
to zero (at least, within the time span considered in this study).
Figure 2 provides a detailed view of the distribution of Dictators￿gifts for
each treatment. To this purpose, we divide Dictators into 3 categories: ￿sel￿sh￿
for c ￿ 100, ￿fair￿for c 2 (100;400), and ￿hyper-fair￿for c ￿ 400. In each dia-
gram of Figure 2, the ￿rst bar plots the absolute frequency of sel￿sh Dictators,
the second corresponds to fair Dictators and the third graphs the number of
hyper-fair Dictators, respectively.
Put Figure 2 around here
Figure 2 allows us to appreciate the evolution of Dictators￿behavior as t
increases, uncovering patterns not detectable in Figure 1.
Sel￿shness is the modal behavior in all treatments and its frequency rises
with t. Over t, the number of hyper-fair individuals steadily decreases, while
the frequency of sel￿sh behavior increases. In 2 of last 3 treatments, we observe
no hyper-fair gift. There is an average of 25% (6 out of 24) of individuals giving
nothing for t ￿ 6, while there is an average of more than 58% of zero-giving
Dictators for t ￿ 10.
Although the median gift for t = 18 looks somehow higher than the other
t > 6 treatments, Figure 2 shows a considerable skewness toward more self-
interest, compared to both t = 2 and t = 6. In fact, 42% (5 out of 12) of
individuals give nothing, compared to average 25% for t ￿ 6.
Figure 2, thus, leads to two conclusions. First, behavior tends to be more self-
interested, the longer the time between the experiment and the day of payment,
con￿rming the pattern visible from Figure 1. Second, the t = 18 treatment
is not as atypical as Figure 1 may initially suggest. This is con￿rmed by the
regression analysis below.
3.2 Regression Analysis














































Figure 2. Distributions of gifts per treatment.
10where ￿ 2 [0;1) is the discount rate, and uit(ci) is a standard Cobb-Douglas
utility function of individual i at time t as follows:
ui(ci) = (1 ￿ ci)1￿￿ic
￿i
i . (2)
The main feature of (2) is that the Dictator is assumed to take into account
both her own and the Receiver￿ s payo⁄s. The parameter ￿i 2 [0;1] measures i￿ s
altruism. If ￿i = 0, i is sel￿sh; if ￿i = 1
2, she maximizes the total welfare, and
if ￿i = 1 she is totally altruistic.
Recall that, in our experiment, both the payo⁄s of Dictator and Receiver
are delayed by the same time interval. Thus, using (1) and (2), we can easily
show that the optimal gift of the Dictator is
ci = ￿i. (3)
In words, Dictators should give the same amount, irrespective of t. This is the
main hypothesis we test.
To this aim, we model Dictators￿gifts as a function of personal characteristics
and time. To test the robustness of our ￿ndings, we provide estimations of two




In (4), 3 variables elicited in the questionnaire are present: sexi, eqi and statei.
The variable sexi = 0(1) for (fe)males, and eqi 2 f0;1g and statei 2 f1;::;7g
use standard questions in social capital surveys.6 Both models contain the men-
tioned variables, time-related variable si, and interactions of the questionnaire
variables and si.
The di⁄erence between the 2 models is the way t enters the estimation. The
most obvious time-dependence of gifts is suggested by Figure 1. Gifts seem to
stay constant for t ￿ 6. Once a certain threshold is reached (t = 10), they jump
down and stay constant. In terms of an econometric model, we de￿ne a time
dummy variable si 2 f0;1g, such that si = 0 if t ￿ 6 and si = 1 otherwise
(Model 1). In the second model, Model 2, we estimate a hyperbolic relation
between gifts and t. Formally, si = 1
ti where ti stands for the treatment i
participates in. Table 1, in the Appendix, reports the estimation results.7
6The variable eqi is an answer to the following question: "Consider the following situation:
Two secretaries with the same age do exactly the same work. However, one of them earns 20e
per week more than the other. The one that is paid more is more e¢ cient and faster, while
working. Do you believe it is fair that one earns more than the other?." The variable eqi = 0
if the answer is "No" and 1 otherwise. The second variable, statei 2 f1;:::;7g, measures the
position of i￿ s opinion between two extreme statements: "The unemployed individuals should
accept any job they are o⁄ered or lose their unemployment bene￿ts", and "The unemployed
individuals should have the right to reject any work they do not like". The closer is i￿ s opinion
to the ￿rst statement, the lower is statei.
7There is a scope for other functional relations between gifts and time. Two other models
have actually been estimated: a model with a dummy for each t and a model where gifts do
not depend on t for t ￿ 6 and hyperbolically decrease otherwise. The estimation results are
in harmony with ￿ndings reported here.
5The main hypothesis, the impact of t on Dictators￿gifts and altruism, is
similar in both models. Mathematically, the marginal e⁄ect of si on ci is:
@ci
@si
= ￿1 + ￿5eqi + ￿6sexi + ￿7statei. (5)
To test whether (5) is on average equal to 0 is analogous to test the following
joint hypotheses:
Ho : ￿1 = 0;￿5 = 0;￿6 = 0 and ￿7 = 0.
The second row of Table 2 lists the p-values of Ho for each model. As we can see,
time has a signi￿cant impact on gifts in both cases, which con￿rms our descrip-
tive ￿ndings of Figure 1. As t rises, Dictators￿giving behavior systematically
changes in the direction of sel￿shness.
Put Table 2 around here.
The marginal e⁄ect of time coincides with (5) in Model 1. In Model 2, the
marginal e⁄ect of t does not coincide with the marginal e⁄ect of s. The actual




row of Table 2 lists the average estimated marginal e⁄ects of t.
Model 1 suggests that subjects give, on average, 12% less for t > 6. In Model
2, as time increases, the gifts decrease and the e⁄ect of time is statistically
signi￿cant. Thus, both models show that time has a negative e⁄ect on gifts.
Last, we test whether the estimated values of the dependent variables are
signi￿cantly positive for large t. Indeed, the tests support the above conjecture
that, on average, gifts are positive for any t > 6.8
4 Discussion
Our experiment uncovers another aspect that drives the Dictator game gifts
down. For instance, the double-blind experimental protocol (Ho⁄man et al.,
1994) and social distance (Jones and Rachlin, 2006) have been observed to
negatively a⁄ect giving. Here we provide evidence that, as payments are delayed,
average gifts tend to decrease. Another interesting result is that the altruism
does not disappear completely.
A possible explanation of our ￿ndings is that self-concern and fairness may be
discounted with di⁄erent rates. Since subjects played only once, and monetary
consequences for Dictators and Receivers were synchronized, we cannot use
our data to estimate the di⁄erent discount rates for Dictators￿and Receivers￿
payo⁄s. For this, a more complex experimental design is necessary. We leave
this for future research.
8The p-values are zero in all cases, using both models.
6Model 1 Model 2
p ￿ value of Ho 0 .02
marginal e⁄ect of t -.12 -.01
Table 2. Test results
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5 Appendix
5.1 Experimental Instructions
￿ Before we ask you to ￿ll a questionnaire, you have make one decision.
￿ There are 24 persons in this room. The computer will randomly select
12 individuals out of these 24 and they will be given an endowment of 1000
ptas.
7￿ At the same time, the computer will randomly asing one of the people
that have not received the endowment to each of the selected individuals. Nei-
ther during nor after the experiment will anybody know who has (s)he formed
the pair with.
￿ Those who have received the 1000 ptas have to decide which part of the
endowment they want to give to the person that has been asigned to her/him.
They can decide any quantity between 0 and 1000.
￿ The other player does not do anything. The payment depends com-
pletely on the decision of the person that has received the endowment.
￿ However, the payments will not be realized right after the experiment.
￿ Rather, you will receive a bank transfer to the bank account number
you had given us.
￿ We will transfer the money in X days.9 You will receive an e-mail once
the transfer has been realized.
￿ If the money has not arrived in the mentioned time, please, send an
e-mail to the jaromirkovarik@merlin.fae.ua.es and we will solve the problem
immediately.
5.2 Estimation Results
Put Table 1 here
9The only di⁄erence across treatments is the number of days the payments are delayed,
i.e. the X is replaced by the corresponding value of the treatment variable t.
8Model 1: Model 2:
si = 0(1)
if t ￿ (>)6 si = 1
ti
b ￿ b ￿ p b ￿ b ￿ p
￿0 .10 .11 .34 .01 .08 .9
￿1 -.04 .13 .75 .53 .45 .25
￿2 -.16 .08 .04 .06 .06 .32
￿3 .16 .06 .01 .03 .06 .58
￿4 .04 .02 .03 0 .01 .87
￿5 .20 .09 .03 -.58 .29 .05
￿6 -.12 .08 .11 .38 .3 .2
￿7 -.04 .02 .05 .01 .08 .91
R2 .32 .21
pjoint 0 .03
Table 1. Estimation results.
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